Annuity Markets in Japan by Sakamoto, Junichi
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
9-1-2010 
Annuity Markets in Japan 
Junichi Sakamoto 
Nomura Research Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Sakamoto, Junichi, "Annuity Markets in Japan" (2010). Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers. 206. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/206 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2011 publication: Securing Lifelong Retirement 
Income. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/206 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Annuity Markets in Japan 
Abstract 
In Japan, annuities are not currently very popular as a means to finance retirement, since many people 
rely on government social security benefits in old age. When annuities are sold, they tend not to be life 
payouts but rather term-certain products. In this sense, the annuity puzzle also applies to Japan. We 
discuss possible reasons for the unpopularity of annuity products, including costs and inequitable 
taxation that hinders people from buying them. 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2011 publication: Securing Lifelong 
Retirement Income. 
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/206 
Comp. by: PG2649 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242107 Date:5/4/11
Time:22:14:05 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242107.3D
Securing Lifelong
Retirement Income:
Global Annuity
Markets and Policy
EDITED BY
Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott,
and Noriyuki Takayama
1
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – , 5/4/2011, SPi
Comp. by: PG2649 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242107 Date:5/4/11
Time:22:14:05 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242107.3D
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
# Pension Research Council, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2011
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
First published 2011
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Data available
Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn
ISBN 978–0–19–959484–9
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – , 5/4/2011, SPi
Comp. by: PG2649 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242104 Date:5/4/11
Time:22:40:40 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242104.3D
Chapter 9
Annuity Markets in Japan
Junichi Sakamoto
In Japan, some retirees are fortunate enough to receive generous occupa-
tional pensions from their former employers, but the number of such
people is relatively small and most must save to pay for life in retirement.1
Financial institutions provide vehicles to facilitate them to do so, including
bank saving deposits, life annuities, life insurance, equities, bonds, and
others. Nevertheless, the Japanese Survey on Life Insurance conducted by
the Life Insurance Culture Centre (2009) shows that more than 40 percent
of people surveyed consider bank deposits as the most reliable saving
vehicle, while 16 percent considered annuities as a reliable vehicle; also
30 percent of respondents believed there was no reliable vehicle. In short,
annuity products are not especially popular among Japanese as a way to
provide retirement income.
In this chapter, we first describe the framework for income security in
retirement in Japan, including financial vehicles available to individuals.
Next, we discuss attitudes toward these financial products and show that
annuities are not especially popular in Japan. Finally, we explore possible
causes for the unpopularity of annuity products, including tax policy that
seems inequitable to those who work for enterprises without corporate
pensions or with those receiving low benefit levels.
The Japanese retirement income security system
To understand the roles played by annuity products offered by life insur-
ance companies or cooperatives in Japan, it is useful to understand the
Japanese retirement income security system (see Figure 9.1). A basic level
of benefit is provided by social insurance schemes. For instance, all resi-
dents are compulsorily covered by the Japanese National Pension (NP)
scheme that provides flat-rate benefits called ‘basic pensions’. Those
covered by the NP scheme are classified into three categories, including
(a) workers aged 20–59 who are self-employed, farmers, fishermen, unem-
ployed, or students, as well as their spouses who work with them or do not
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work for pay; (b) a second category consisting of both private and public
employees; and (c) a third category which includes the dependent spouses
aged 20–59 of employees in the second category. This last group is mainly
dependent housewives who can receive the flat-rate basic pension without
paying contributions into the NP scheme.2 All employees are also compul-
sorily covered by one of the employee pension schemes3 that provide
earnings-related benefits.4 So, a married retiree couple can receive two
basic pensions and one or two earnings-related pensions if they have
careers as employees. If they have been self-employed throughout their
career, they have two basic pensions. The monthly basic pension amount in
the case of forty years of coverage is about JPY 66,000 (US $730, Euro 530)5
in FY 2010.6 On the other hand, the earnings-related pensions will, roughly
speaking, eventually be about 20 percent7 of the career average of indexed
(or ‘revalued’)8 annual pensionable remunerations in the case of forty-year
coverage.
On top of this base are complementary pension plans, of two types:
employment-based plans and other plans for individuals. There are four
employment-based plans including the Employees’ Pension Funds (EPF),
the Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plans (DB), the Corporate-type
Defined Contribution Pension Plans (DC), and the Lump-Sum Retirement
Benefit (LSRB) Plans.9 The EPF plans are defined benefit plans but substi-
tute a portion of the old-age EPI (Employees’ Pension Insurance) benefits;
they normally cover employees satisfying a certain set of conditions pre-
scribed in the plan statute, and there is no room for individual employees
to decide whether to opt in or out. There are three types of complementary
pension plans for individuals, where the first category includes four
schemes established by law: the National Pension Funds (NPFs), the Farm-
ers’ Pension Fund (FPF), the Individual-type DC, and the Employees’ Asset
Building Promotion Scheme (Government of Japan 2009; we say more on
these below). A second group includes annuity products offered by life
insurance companies, agricultural cooperatives, and mutual cooperatives.
The third group includes bank deposits and similar vehicles by securities
companies.
One may argue that bank deposits are not annuities and hence not a
form of complementary pension plan. Yet, it is very difficult to tell the
difference from the perspective of retired persons’ economic life between
drawing money regularly out of a bank account versus receiving annuities
from an annuity-certain contract. Both of them make complementary
income for the retired people to enrich their retirement life. Consequent-
ly, this chapter focuses on complementary pension plans offered to
individuals.
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Complementary pension plans for individuals
Delving into more detail into the four statutory schemes mentioned above,
the NPF system is for the people in the first category of the NP scheme.
Introduced in 1991, the system is not compulsory and people may join
the fund on a voluntary basis. Two kinds of NPF funds are available, the
regional type and the occupational type. Each one of the forty-seven
Japanese prefectures has one regional-type NPF fund. Other than these,
there are also twenty-five occupational-type NPF funds such as the fund for
medical practitioners, for lawyers, etc. The NPF funds offer life annuities
and annuities-certain, where participants can choose one of them or com-
bine them. It is generally argued that the first layer should be a life annuity;
if a participant chooses several of them, the sum of the annuity amount
from the life annuities should exceed the sum of the annuity amount of an
annuity-certain payout. The upper ceiling of the total amount of premiums
is JPY 68,000 per month (approximately US $756 or EUR 548). This ceiling
only applies to an individual; if a couple participates in the NPF fund, each
of them can pay premiums up to JPY 68,000. However, if the participant
also participates in the FPF or in the Individual-type DC, then contributions
to these plans are also counted and the ceiling of the premiums for the NPF
fund is lowered accordingly (Farmers’ Pension Fund 2009a). The pre-
miums are tax-deductible.
Although the NPF funds provide a fairly generous premium ceiling, the
number of participants in these funds is limited. As of end-March 2009, the
number of participants was only 610,000, or 3 percent of the people in
the first NP category. The number of pensioners was about 244,000. The
size of the reserve fund was about JPY 2.2 trillion, that is, about US $24
billion or EUR 17.5 billion. The FPF is a defined contribution pension for
farmers where the reserve fund is collectively invested and managed. Each
participant pays contributions of no less than JPY 20,000 and no more than
JPY 67,000, per month. The number of participants is also small, at end-
March 2009 being only 57,000 in total, and the reserve fund stood at JPY
110 billion (Farmers’ Pension Fund 2009b). The FPF was introduced in
1971 and started as a defined benefit plan. Yet, as the number of farmers
decreased rapidly, its financial conditions worsened and eventually it
changed into a defined contribution plan in 2003. It began registering its
first defined-contribution participants in April 2004.
The Individual-type DC was implemented in 2002 and its implementation
is delegated to theNational Pension FundAssociation (2009). Anyone in the
first category of the NP scheme or any employee except for those covered by
either an EPF plan, or a DB, a Corporate-type DC, or a Tax-Qualified
Pension Plans (TQPP), can join the Individual-type DC on a voluntary
basis. The participants in the first category of the NP scheme can contribute
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up to JPY 68,000 per month, while employee participants can contribute up
to JPY 23,000 per month.10 If a participant in the Individual-type DC is also a
participant in the NPF fund or in the FPF fund, the contribution ceiling is
lowered by the contribution amount to these schemes. As of end-March
2009, there were 101,000 participants in the Individual-type DC, out of
which 39,000 participants were in the first category of the NP scheme and
62,000 were employees. The number is still very small. The share of the
participants in the first category of the NP scheme is about 0.2 percent and
that of the employee participants in the EPI scheme is about 0.2 percent.
The Employees’ Asset Building Promotion Scheme is a saving promotion
program operated in cooperation with employers and the government. It
tends to be introduced in enterprises at the initiative of the employer, and
employees join it on a voluntary basis. There are three options in the
scheme: the first is an ordinary saving course wherein employees contract
with banking corporations and accumulate a fixed amount of money in the
account every month. There is no tax advantage for this, but since employ-
ers deduct the fixed amount from the salary and hand it over to the bank
directly, it seems a more certain way to build up. The second option
involves a contract with life insurance companies or banks; the employer
then deducts a fixed amount of salary and hands it over to the life insur-
ance firm or bank. This option provides some tax advantages on the
interest, but if one terminates the contract before the retirement age,
one must pay some penalty (the tax advantage is explained below with
the third option). If the provider is a life insurer, the worker may have a life
annuity contract, but if the provider is a bank, only an annuity-certain
contract is feasible. The third option is a dedicated saving account for
housing, and if one terminates the contract for the purpose other than
obtaining a house to live in, a penalty is then incurred. The tax advantage
for the second and the third options is that interest is not taxed as long as
the sum of the principal and interest does not exceed JPY 5.5 million
(about US $61,000 or EUR 44,000) when the contract is with a financial
institution other than an insurer, or as long as the principal is nomore than
JPY 3,850,000 (about US $42,800 or EUR 31,000) if the contract is with an
insurance company.
The Employees’ Asset Building Promotion Scheme was introduced in
1971, and as of March 2009, there were 6.7 million contracts for the first
option, 2.2 million contracts for the second option, and 1.1 million con-
tracts for the third option (corresponding assets were JPY 10.4 trillion, JPY
3.9 trillion, and JPY 2.7 trillion, respectively). Since annuity contracts are
part of the second option,11 there are not so many annuity contracts in this
program, either.
A second group of complementary pension plans for individuals involves
annuity products offered by life insurance companies,12 agricultural coop-
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eratives, and mutual cooperatives. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on
howmany people have annuity contracts with those financial institutions or
what average benefit levels are. Nevertheless, the Life Insurance Culture
Centre (2009) conducted a survey on household relationships with life
insurers in Spring 2009 and obtained 4,054 responses from households
with at least two members. To summarize survey results related to annuity
contracts, we first see that 23 percent of the households had annuity
contracts with life insurance companies, agricultural cooperatives, or
mutual cooperatives; there, the average annual amount of the annuities
was JPY 1,119,000 (US $12,400, EUR 9,000). These annuity contracts partly
duplicate the tallies for annuity contracts under the Employees’ Asset
Building Promotion Scheme. But here, the majority are annuities-certain
and life annuities make up only 17 percent of the whole. The distribution
of how long the annuity payments last is provided in Table 9.1. Table 9.2
shows the distribution of the ages when the annuity begins to be paid.
The survey also looked into the types of financial vehicles on which
people rely for retirement life, and the results appear in Table 9.3. The
most popular vehicle is bank deposits and similar products, in that over 40
percent of the households surveyed relied on them. The next most popular
was life insurance, with 23 percent of the households holding these. The
third was annuity products, held by 16.3 percent, much less than bank
deposits. Also, about 30 percent of the households stated that there is no
reliable financial vehicle for retirement living.
Other statistics also show that annuity products are not popular among
the Japanese. For instance, the Life Insurance Association of Japan pub-
lishes annual statistics on the number of contracts by type of insurance, and
in March 2009, the forty-five life insurance companies13 that were members
of the Association had about 17.4 million annuity contracts14 worth a total
Table 9.1 Duration of annuity payments in Japan
Duration of annuity
payment
Household heads having such contracts as
percentage of households surveyed (%)
5 years 9.6
10 years 38.6
15 years 7.6
Lifetime 16.5
Other 2.1
Unclear 29.2
Note : If a household head has two or more annuity contracts, each of his/her contracts is
counted.
Source : Author’s calculations based on Life Insurance Association of Japan (2009); see text.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – , 5/4/2011, SPi
164 Securing Lifelong Retirement Income
Comp. by: PG2649 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001242104 Date:5/4/11
Time:22:40:40 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001242104.3D
of JPY 89.3 trillion (US $1.0 trillion, EUR 720 billion). Here the amount of
the contract refers to the present value of the annuity from its payment start
date (if not yet in payment status), and the present value of remaining
payments in payout. In Japan, many households have multiple annuity
contracts, so the number of households with annuity contracts is much
Table 9.2 Age at which annuity payments start in Japan
Age when annuity
payments start
Household head having such contracts as
percentage of households surveyed (%)
Younger than 60 5.6
60 30.5
61–64 5.3
65 25.8
66–69 3.0
70 or older 7.6
Unclear 26.7
Note: If a household head has two or more annuity contracts, each of his/her contracts is
counted.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Life Insurance Association of Japan (2009); see text.
Table 9.3 Reliable financial vehicles to save for retirement
Financial vehicles Households that answered ‘yes’ to this
financial vehicle as percentage of households
surveyed (%)
Deposits in banks or trusts 41.7
Life insurance 23.1
Annuity 16.3
Real estate 15.9
Securities 9.4
Employees’ Asset Building
Promotion Scheme
5.2
Casualty insurance 3.1
Others 1.4
No reliable vehicle 30.3
Unclear 6.5
Note : If a household head has two or more annuity contracts, each of his/her contracts is
counted.
Source : Author’s calculations based on Life Insurance Association of Japan (2009); see text.
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smaller than 17.4 million (Life Insurance Association of Japan 2009). The
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2009) esti-
mated that the total number of households was about 50 million, confirm-
ing that annuity contracts are not widespread in Japan.
The third group of complementary pensions for individuals consists
principally of bank deposits and financial vehicles offered by securities
companies. On average, people surveyed by the National Survey of Family
Income and Expenditure of 200415 had bank deposits and other financial
vehicles worth JPY 13,591,000 (US $151,000 or EUR 110,000), and secu-
rities averaging JPY 2,980,000 (US $33,000 or EUR 24,000). This shows that
bank deposits are very popular among Japanese. Relatively few rely entirely
on own saving for retirement income, since only about 6 percent relied
entirely on private pensions in 2005 (Government of Japan 2005).16 In-
stead, most people rely mainly on social security benefits; their annual
income is JPY 4,139,000 (US $46,000 or EUR 33,000) and the average social
security benefit is JPY 3,120,000 (US $35,000 or EUR 25,000) or about
three-quarters. The share of the benefits from private pensions was about
6 percent.
Why annuity products are unpopular in Japan
The private annuity market is very small in most countries, with few excep-
tions (Mackenzie 2006), and Japan is not one of them. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to identify the exact causes for their unpopularity. One reason
might be that people perceive that commissions on the annuity products
are expensive. While people may not know insurance mathematics, they
can add up the premiums they pay and the sum of the annuity benefits they
expect to receive. They may also believe that bank deposits are free of
commissions, despite the fact that the interest paid is very low.
Another reason is that Japanese people tend to be disinterested in life
annuities, a trait observed in pension plan designs and member behaviors
in occupational pension plans as well. Many DB plans only offer term-
certain annuities, and even when a plan does offer a life annuity, there is
always a provision that allows members to convert it into a lump-sum
benefit. In the latter case, most members choose the lump-sum. We also
observe that life insurance companies and cooperatives do not seem active
in promoting the sales of life annuities, perhaps seeking to avoid longevity
risk.
An additional explanation for the peoples’ reluctance to purchase an-
nuities is that some may want to keep money on hand to deal with catastro-
phically expensive events such as hospitalization or unemployment, or
home repairs. Bank deposits are more liquid for this purpose than annuity
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contracts. Also, banks in Japan are seen as more reliable than life insurance
companies or cooperatives, particularly since in some instances, life insur-
ance companies have declared bankruptcy and annuitants suffered large
losses. People might also believe that the government would give bailouts
to banks if they got into difficulty.
A final reason people do not favor lifetime annuities is that the tax system
does not encourage them. Although individual tax advantages exist for
some retirement income programs, there is no comprehensive tax treat-
ment for such financial vehicles. For example, if a person took out an
annuity contract with a life insurance company or cooperative, the annual
premiums paid are only tax-deductible up to the low ceiling of JPY 50,000
(US $556 or EUR 400), and benefits received are taxed. Another example is
that there is no tax advantage for bank deposits even if one put money in
them for retirement purposes. Thus, the current tax system is indifferent to
individual efforts to accumulate assets for retirement security.
While these factors surely contribute to the unpopularity of annuity
products in Japan, it might be the case that some defined contribution
plan participants may seek to convert these assets into annuity contracts at
retirement in the future. But currently, few people do so, suggesting that it is
unlikely that the number of annuity contracts will grow rapidly in the future.
Taxation issues
Whether the market for annuities grows in Japan will depend on the tax
system. While occupational pension plans enjoy tax advantages, these plans
are prevalent. But there are no or small tax advantages for individual efforts
for income security, outside the NPF, the FPF, the Individual-type DC, and
the Employees’ Asset Building Promotion Scheme. There is no tax incen-
tive to encourage those people whose firms offer no occupational pension
plans or have occupational pension plans which pay low benefit levels, to
accumulate retirement assets for themselves. One reason this may be true is
that there is no way to verify that the tax advantages are used properly. Of
course, this is a big disadvantage for employees without employment-based
complementary pension plans or with low levels of employment-based
complementary pension plans. Accordingly, the current inequitable tax
treatment deserves another look.
A more equitable opportunity to save for retirement would allow a
uniform ceiling for tax-deductible contributions, including contributions
by employers to the employment-based complementary pension plans, and
statutory complementary pension contributions for individuals. Interest on
these contributions could also be tax-deductible. In this sense, the reform
would follow the logic of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and
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would include a comprehensive and consistent tax treatment for comple-
mentary pensions as a whole.
Some technical difficulties might result including the need to gather
information on pension contributions and earnings; perhaps it would be
necessary to introduce a tax-filing number to track these. Another issue
would be how to treat lump-sum contributions to the complementary
pension plans for individuals. Many people save most of their lump-sum
retirement payments for retirement when they retire from their compa-
nies. It would be sensible to impose a similar tax treatment for such lump-
sum payments as for monthly contributions.
Finally, it would be useful to review existing tax treatments for the variety
of old-age schemes already in place in Japan. For example, employee
contributions to the EPF and NPF are tax-deductible,17 while employee
contributions to DB are not.18 This sort of irregularity can be corrected and
made consistent with other tax-favored retirement programs, to make it
easier to meet income needs in retirement.
Conclusion
Annuities have not been popular in Japan as a means to finance retirement.
And when annuities are found, they tend not to be life payouts but rather
term-certain products. Possible reasons for the unpopularity of annuity pro-
ducts include costs and inequitable taxation that hinders people frombuying
them. To date, the tax authority has not discussed reforming the tax system
comprehensively and consistently to enhance people’s efforts to save for
retirement. Doing so would expand the annuity market as by-product.
Notes
1 The Comprehensive Survey on Working Conditions (Government of Japan 2009)
reports that retirement benefit plans are offered by 84 percent of enterprises with
more than thirty employees, but benefit levels vary fromone enterprise to another.
2 To finance the benefit expenditures of the basic pensions, every social security
pension scheme transfers the designated amount of money to the Basic Pension
Sub-account that manages the revenue and expenditures for the basic pen-
sion payments. The designated amount of money is determined in the following
way. The total amount of basic pension expenditures is divided among the social
security pension schemes in proportion to the number of active participants aged
20–59 of the schemes plus, in the case of schemes for employees, the number of
dependent spouses aged 20–59. The share is the designated amount of money for
each scheme. Thus, the dependent spouses in the third category of the NP
scheme are deemed to have paid contributions to the NP scheme.
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3 The social security pension schemes in Japan include the Employees’ Pension
Insurance (EPI) scheme that covers private sector employees, the Mutual
Aid Association (MAA) scheme for government employees, the MAA scheme
for local government employees, and the MAA scheme for private school em-
ployees.
4 Enterprises that are not legal entities with fewer than five employees are not
covered by the EPI scheme. The employees therefore only have the flat-rate NP
benefits. Part-time employees of any enterprises who work for fewer than three-
quarters of the working hours of regular employees are not covered by the EPI
scheme, either.
5 We assume that US $1 = JPY 90, Euro 1 = JPY 124.
6 FY means fiscal year. In Japan, the fiscal year starts on 1 April and ends on 31
March.
7 Currently, it is about 26 percent of the career average of revalued annual
disposable income. It is projected that it will eventually reduce to about 23
percent, after modified indexation reforms are applied.
8 ‘Revalued pensionable remunerations’ mean pensionable remunerations in-
dexed to the increase of gross wages minus the accumulated difference between
the increase of gross wages and the increase of disposable income since 1988.
Furthermore, the 2009 actuarial valuation shows that the benefit level is pro-
jected to be reduced by about 8.6 percent through modified indexation; the
ultimate benefit level would be 20 percent of the career average of revalued
annual pensionable remunerations in the case of forty years of coverage.
9 There is another group of corporate pension plans called Tax-Qualified Pension
Plans (TQPP), but they are to be abolished by the end of March 2012. LSRB
plans of individual companies are managed on a book reserve basis, but, for
small companies that cannot manage such LSRB plans for themselves, there is a
fund called the Workers’ Retirement Allowance Mutual Aid Fund (WRAMAF)
for small companies established on a statute. Small companies can join the
WRAMAF on a voluntary basis.
10 The fairly large difference in the contribution ceilings between the participants
in the first category of the NP scheme and the employees is mainly attributable to
the fact that there are no earnings-related social security pensions for the people
in the first category of the NP scheme.
11 They are the contracts with life insurance companies in the second option.
12 Life insurance companies include the Japan Post Insurance Co. Ltd. that was
privatized in 2007.
13 The number of the member companies was forty-six at the end of March 2009,
but the Yamato Life went bankrupt in 2008, so the statistics exclude data for
Yamato Life.
14 The statistics exclude contracts with agricultural cooperatives and mutual coop-
eratives, but these are few in number. According to Life Insurance Association of
Japan (2009), the number of annuity contracts with agricultural cooperatives was
about 3.2 million and that of annuity contracts with mutual cooperatives was 0.2
million in March 2009.
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15 The National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure is conducted every five
years and the latest survey was carried out in 2009. Results are yet to be published
as of summer 2010, so we can only refer to the 2004 survey.
16 They may mainly be medical practitioners or lawyers.
17 The bill to introduce employee contributions to DC also stipulates that employee
contributions are tax-deductible; the bill is slated for discussion in the Diet in
2010.
18 Strictly speaking, employee contributions to DB are treated in the same way as
the premiums for life insurance contracts. A tax deduction is permitted up to JPY
50,000 (US $556 or EUR 400) per year, which is very little. The ceiling is applied
to the sum of the employee contributions and other premiums for life insurance
contracts. In many cases, premiums for life insurance contracts already exceed
the ceiling leaving no room for employee tax-deductible contributions.
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